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THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIME AND THE
MUNICIPAL LAW OF FEDERAL STATES:
HOW CLOSE A FIT?
DAviD A. WIRTH*
Professor Stewart invites us to draw an analogy between the interna-
tional legal regime and federal or federalizing systems like the United States
and the European Community (EC). Certainly the United States and the
EC, particularly after the adoption of the Single European Act,' have the
capacity to effectively reconcile the twin goals of trade and environmental
quality. Although there are counterexamples, 2 it is remarkable how seldom
these dual aims, both of which promote public welfare, have come into
conflict in either system with the vehemence they recently have exhibited
on the international level. While law and practice in federal or federalizing
systems may provide informative and helpful perspectives about the inter-
national legal system, we need to be extremely careful not to overextend
the comparison. Unless Professor Stewart is advocating the creation of a
supranational world government-a proposition he does not seem to assert-
recent developments suggest the limits of the correlation between the inter-
national regime and federal systems.
The international system contains no rulemaking authority with sover-
eign powers analogous to the Congress of the United States or the Council
of the European Communities.3 Instead, the principal "legislative" process,
the negotiation of multilateral treaties4 like the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)5 and international environmental agreements, proceeds
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. Single European Act, Feb. 17 & Feb. 28, 1986, art. 25, 19 BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp.
(No. 2) at 16 (1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 506 (1986) [hereinafter Single European Act]
(adding title VII, articles 130R-130T to Treaty of Rome, and establishing authority of European
Economic Community "to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment").
2. See infra note 15.
3. As added by the Single European Act, supra note 1, article 130S of the Treaty of
Rome anticipates that at least some actions pertaining to environmental protection may be
taken by qualified majority and not by consensus.
4. Despite considerable academic writing on the subject, customary international law
plays relatively little practical role in interactions among states on international environmental
issues. See David A. Wirth, A Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying International Law and
American Environmental Law, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 377, 380 (1992) [hereinafter Wirth, A
Matchmaker's Challenge]; Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104
HARV. L. REv. 1484, 1521-50 (1991). Customary law has played a similarly small role in the
law of international economic relations. See, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, introductory note to part VIII (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT].
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according to the related principles of consensus and consent. As demon-
strated by the GATT Uruguay Round6 and the climate change convention
opened for signature at the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED)-the so-called "Earth Summit"-in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil in June 1992,7 a single powerful nation like the United States
can in some cases dictate the terms of a multilateral agreement or prevent
its adoption altogether. When multiplied by the number of participating
states, this dynamic can produce least common denominator results8 that
are not responsive to real-world problems like excessive trade barriers or
threats from environmental externalities. In other cases, as demonstrated by
the United States' decision not to sign the UNCED biodiversity convention, 9
states need not accept the obligations even in supposedly universal instru-
ments. Other states, although signing a multilateral treaty, may encounter
domestic political obstacles that prevent acceptance of the international
obligations. The necessity for signature and, especially, ratification can
delay' O or, in extreme cases, preclude" the entry into force of a multilateral
agreement.
6. See Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations in GATT, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter
Dunkel Draft]. As of this writing, the Uruguay Round has not been completed. See Stuart
Auerbach & Richard M. Weintraub, World Trade Talks Again at an Impass; U.S., Europe
Can't Agree on Farm Subsidies, WASH. PosT, Oct. 22, 1992, at DII.
7. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
851 [hereinafter Climate Change Convention]. After the conclusion of the UN conference, the
head of the United States delegation acknowledged that "the United States stood alone in
resisting a commitment to targets and timetables for reducing C02 emissions." Memorandum
from William K. Reilly, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, to all EPA Em-
ployees (July 15, 1992) [hereinafter Reilly Memorandum]. See generally David A. Wirth &
Daniel A. Lashof, Beyond Vienna and Montreal: A Global Framework Convention on
Greenhouse Gases, 2 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNEMP.. PROBS. 79 (1992) (discussing negotiations).
8. See, e.g., PETER H. SAND, LEssoNs LEARNED IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOvERNANcE
6 (1990).
9. Convention on Biological Diversity, May 22, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 822. "The United
States [sic] decision not to sign [this agreement] was the subject of intense controversy and
criticism." Reilly Memorandum, supra note 7.
10. E.g., SAND, supra note 8, at 14-18 (describing "slowest boat" phenomenon resulting
from delay required for ratification and additional lag resulting from need for minimum
number of ratifications required by many multilateral agreements). For most trade agreements
and some environmental agreements, the need for implementing legislation in the United States
can create further delays. The "fast track" procedures that establish deadlines and timetables
and limit amendments to implementing legislation address this problem, but not necessarily
without raising additional criticisms. See, e.g., Joan Claybrook, Fast Track Can be Hazardous
to Your Health, WASH. POST, May 17, 1991, at A25 (arguing that fast tract process is
undemocratic). But see Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy,
18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143 (1992) (arguing that fast track improves efficiency without
compromising democratic values).
11. A good example is the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities, June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868 (not in force). This agreement will probably never
become effective because of domestic environmental opposition in a number of states, including
1390
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International enforcement mechanisms are of limited availability and
efficacy. Professor Jackson suggests that GATT dispute settlement has
"developed into a remarkably full procedure that has been largely, but not
totally, effective.''12 Unfortunately, the same cannot be said with respect to
international environmental obligations. Whatever reservations there may be
about the efficacy of dispute settlement in trade agreements are magnified
many times over in the environmental fleld.' 3 In short-although we do not
often admit it-the international system as currently structured invites the
proliferation of holdouts, free riders, laggards, scofflaws, and defectors.
This situation is not necessarily good or bad, right or wrong. It is,
however, a practical reality that creates dynamics that are totally different
from those in a federal or federalizing system. Professor Stewart notes
4
that there is no precedent in federal systems for the use of countervailing
duties to offset disparities among national production processes. The reason
for this is obvious. In a federal system, there are effective law-making and
law-enforcement mechanisms that provide alternatives to unilateral measures
that disrupt trade flows enacted by subsidiary governmental units. Indeed,
federal systems like the United States and the EC can and do invalidate
rules adopted by their constituent components that impede trade.", This
phenomenon, however, reveals relatively little about the appropriate use of
trade measures in an international system in which the mechanisms for
defining and implementing law to address such issues as environmental
externalities are considerably less effective and less responsive than in a
France and Australia, which are necessary for the convention's entry into force. See Christopher
C. Joyner, Remarks, 85 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 464 (1991); Brian R. Murphy, Note,
Antarctic Treaty System-Does the Minerals Regime Signal the Beginning of the End?, 14
SUFFOLK TRASNAT'L L.J. 521 (1991).
12. John H. Jackson, World Trade and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1251 (1992). The current proposal in the Uruguay Round, for
instance, would strengthen dispute settlement procedures by specifying that panel reports shall
be adopted by the GATT Council within sixty days of issuance and by establishing a standing
appellate body, whose reports must be adopted by the Council within thirty days of issuance
unless rejected by consensus. Dunkel Draft, supra note 6, § S (draft understanding on rules
and procedures governing settlement of disputes under GATT articles XXII and XXIII); cf.
William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 5.1 (1988) (recom-
mending improvements in GATT dispute settlement procedures).
13. See David A. Wirth, Reexamining International Decision-Making Processes (forth-
coming 1993) (on file with David Wirth); David A. Wirth, Book Review, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL.
L. 479, 481-82 (1991) (reviewing International Law and Pollution edited by Daniel B. McGraw).
14. Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons From the Federal
Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1329 (1992).
15. E.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992) (invalidating state hazardous waste disposal statute as inconsistent with
Commerce Clause); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (same);
City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (same); Case 302/86, Commission v.
Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, 1 C.M.L.R. 619 (1989) (quantitative restrictions on imported
beverages sold in containers not approved by Danish government for reuse inconsistent with
Treaty of Rome).
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federal system. In a smoothly functioning federal system, there is little or
no need for self-help. But on the international level, as the GATT and
other international trade agreements at least implicitly recognize, at-the-
border adjustments and countervailing duties may be the only remedy
available. The question then becomes not whether unilateral trade measures
are appropriate, but under what circumstances they are warranted.
The international trade system, whatever its flaws, is a considerably
more mature regime than the totality or any part of international environ-
mental law. The GATT came into existence soon after World War II. By
contrast, the first binding, substantive, and potentially universal multilateral
agreements on such pressing environmental problems as exports of hazardous
wastes 6 and depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer 7 have been concluded
only in the last five years. Negotiations on the only international legal
norms designed to safeguard the integrity of the Earth's climate 8 and the
first comprehensive attempt to provide in situ protection for the planet's
biological diversity19 have only just concluded with the opening of new
multilateral conventions for signature at the Earth Summit.
But for the formalities, the GATT is effectively an international organ-
ization with a secretariat housed in Geneva that potentially has jurisdiction
over the entire range of trade-related issues. The ongoing Uruguay Round
is the eighth in a more or less linear sequence of international attempts to
overcome impediments to free trade in a unified fashion by establishing a
reasonably well-developed set of norms in a setting of considerable organ-
izational continuity. These rules govern an increasingly wide array of sub-
stantive issues, including in the proposed Uruguay Round not only food
safety laws but also intellectual property rights.20 As noted above, the
GATT's dispute settlement provisions, while perhaps not as effective as
they might be, are generally more efficacious than in other areas of
international law. Bilateral or regional trade' agreements, like the recently-
completed North American Free Trade Agreement, 2' generally rely on fun-
damental GATT principles and are consciously structured to be consistent
with the global regime.
16. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.II.M. 657 [hereinafter Basel Convention].
17. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550, amended and adjusted 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
18. Climate Change Convention, supra note 7. See generally Wirth & Lashof, supra note
7.
19. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 42 I.L.M. 822 [hereinafter Bio-
diversity Convention].
20. Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, in Dunkel Draft, supra note 6, at 58.
21. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., available in
LEXIS, GENFED-EXTRA Database; WL, NAFTA Database (not in force) [hereinafter
NAFTA].
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In the environmental area, there is no similar central focal point. Besides
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)22 which is headquar-
tered in Nairobi, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 23 in Lon-
don, the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)24in Geneva, the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)21 in
22, Among others, the Biodiversity Convention, supra note 19, and the Basel Convention,
supra note 16, and the Montreal Protocol, supra note 17, were negotiated under UNEP
auspices.
23. The following major multilateral agreements were negotiated under IMO auspices:
Protocol of 1978 Relating to the. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL), Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 (incorporating by reference 1973
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 12 I.L.M. 1319);
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
(London Dumping Convention), Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120.
24. The following important multilateral environmental agreements were adopted under
the auspices of the ECE: Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context (Espoo Convention), Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 802; Protocol to the 1979 Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile
Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary Fluxes, Nov. 18, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 568 (not in
force); Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Trans-
boundary Fluxes (Sofia Protocol), Oct. 31, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 212; Protocol to the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions
or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least Thirty Per Cent (Helsinki Protocol), July 8, 1985,
27 I.L.M. 698; Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), Nov. 13,
1979, 18 I.L.M. 1442.
25. Besides the 1972 Polluter-Pays Recommendation, infra note 60, the OECD has
adopted the following important recommendations: Council Decision-Recommendation Con-
cerning Provision of Information to the Public and Public Participation in Decision-Making
Processes Related to the Prevention of, and Response to, Accidents Involving Hazardous
Substances, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(88)85 (Aug. 8, 1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 278 (1989);
Recommendation on Measures Required to Facilitate the Environmental Asessment of Aid
Projects and Programmes, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(86)26 (Nov. 21, 1986); Recommendation on
Environmental Assessment of Development Assistance Projects and Programmes, O.E.C.D.
Doc. C(85)104 (June 20, 1985), reprinted in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT 30 (1986) [hereinafter OECD AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT]; Recommendation on the Assessment of Projects With Significant Impact on the
Environment, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(79)116 (May 5, 1979), reprinted in OECD AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT, supra, at 29; Recommendation for Strengthening International Co-operation on Envi-
ronmental Protection in Frontier Regions, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(78)77 (Sept. 27, 1978), reprinted
in 17 I.L.M. 1530 (1978); Recommendation for the Implementation of a Regime of Equal
Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontter Pollution, O.E.C.D.
Doc. C(77)28 (May 23, 1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 977 (1977); Recommendation on Equal
Right of Access in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(76)55 (May 18,
1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1218 (1976); Recommendation on Principles Concerning Trans-
frontier Pollution, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(74)224 (Nov. 21, 1974), reprinted in-14 I.L.M. 242 (1975);
Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(74)223
(Nov. 14, 1974), reprinted in OECD- AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 26; Recommendation
on the Analysis of the Environmental Consequences of Significant Public and Private Projects,
O.E.C.D. Doc. C(74)216 (Nov. 14, 1974), reprinted in OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT, at 28.
Recommendations express nonbinding undertakings for those OECD members that agree to
them. See Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Dec.
14, 1960, art. 5, para. b, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 179.
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Paris, and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)2 6 in Rome,
play major roles in environmental issues. The negotiation of the recently-
adopted climate change convention27was entrusted to another, new body,
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC). 2 The INC's work built
on that of yet another specially-created institution, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a cooperative undertaking of UNEP and
still another international organization, the World Meteorological Organi-
zation. By comparison with the GATT, international environmental agree-
ments are largely unconnected and uncoordinated attempts to deal with
discrete problems like protection of the stratospheric ozone layer, 29 conser-
vation of endangered species,30 and environmental harm from international
shipments of hazardous wastes.
3 '
Just as environmental measures may be subject to the constraints
established by a trade regime, environmental standards may govern trade
in commodities such as chlorofluorocarbons, 2 endangered species, 3a hazard-
ous wastes,3 industrial chemicals,35 and pesticides.3" However, as described
above, the enforcement mechanisms in most environmental agreements are
thin, and there is nothing comparable to the GATT dispute settlement
process to encourage compliance with those agreement's standards on a
more or less routine basis.3 Consequently, environmental measures are
26. For example, the FAO's International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use
of Pesticides, F.A.O. Sales No. M/R8130/E/5.86//3000, art. 9 (1986) [hereinafter FAO Code
of Conduct], establishes good practice standards for government and industry with respect to
commerce-in, and use of, pesticides.
27. See supra note 7.
28. See generally Wirth & Lashof, supra note 7.
29. Montreal Protocol, supra note 17.
30. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
31. Basel Convention, supra note 16.
32. Montreal Protocol, supra note 17, art. 4, at 1554-55.
33. CITES, supra note 30.
34. Basel Convention, supra note 16.
35. London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International
Trade, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.155/L.l Annex I (1987), adopted G.C. Dec. 14/27, 42 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 25) at 79, U.N. Doc. A/42/25 (1987), amended U.N. Doc. UNEP/PIC/
WG.2/4 app. (1989), adopted as amended G.C. Dec. 15/30, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25)
at 156, U.N. Doc. A/44/25 (1989), reprinted in 19 ENVTL POL'Y & L. 125 (1989).
36. FAQ Code of Conduct, supra note 26.
37. While most international environmental agreements do not provide for binding, third
party dispute resolution, there have recently been attempts to craft informal, multilateral
processes to encourage implementation and compliance that are somewhat analogous to the
GATT panel procedures. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 7, arts. 10, 13 at 863-
64, 866 (establishing subsidiary body for implementation of conference of parties and directing
conference of parties at its first meeting to "consider the establishment of a multilateral
consultative process, available to Parties on their request, for the resolution of questions
regarding the implementation of the Convention"); Report of the Second Meeting of the
Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UNEP/
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considerably more likely to be subjected to a trade discipline than the other
way around. And from an environmental point of view, the trade dispute
settlement process provides only one remedy: a conclusion that the offending
measure should be eliminated.
One effect of this disparity has been a gradual but persistent tightening
of the trade constraints on unilateral or even multilateral environmentally
motivated trade" measures to fill the gaps in global regimes that do not
necessarily respond sufficiently quickly or effectively in addressing environ-
mental externalities. The GATT creates an explicit exemption for measures
designed to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, provided that
those measures are "necessary." 38 Last year's tuna panel report39 interpreted
"necessary" to imply a requirement that a state "exhaust[] all options
reasonably available ... through measures consistent with the General
Agreement."' 4 A second exemption applies to exhaustible natural resources
"if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption."141 One GATT panel interpreted this
provision as requiring a demonstration that the measures in question were
"primarily aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural resources. '42 A
panel convened under the auspices of the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, which incorporates GATT Article XX by reference, suggested
in addition that a trade measure would have to satisfy a cost-benefit test
to qualify for the exemption.43 Moreover, both exceptions are interpreted
narrowly. 4 Not surprisingly, barely a single trade measure whose validity
turns on the application of one or the other of these exemptions has ever
been held to be consistent with the GATT.
4 5
OzL.Pro.2/3, Annex III (June 1990) (establishing five-member Implementation Committee to
rule on cases of asserted failure to implement Montreal Protocol), reprinted in 1 Y.B. INT'L
ENVTL. L. 591, 630 (1990).
38. GATT, supra note 5, art. XX(b), 61 stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262; see Steve
Charnovitz, GATT and the Environment: Examining the Issues, 4 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 203,
212-14 (1992) (in press) (criticizing "the mutating 'necessary' test").
39. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin
Panel Report].
40. Id., para. 5.28, at 1620.
41. GATT, supra note 5, art. XX(g), 61 stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
42. Report of the GA TT Panel, Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon, para. 4.6, GATT Doc. L/6268 (Mar. 22, 1989), BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS [hereinafter BISD] 35th Supp. 98, 114, see also Tuna/Dolphin Panel
Report, supra note 39, para. 5.33, at 1621.
43. In re Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Panel
No. CDA-89-1807-01, 1989 FTAPD LEXIS (Binational Panel Oct. 16, 1989) (requirement that
fish caught in Canadian waters be "landed" in Canada under Article XX(g), incorporated by
reference into article 1201 of United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 27 I.L.M. 281
(1988), not justified in light of available less burdensome alternatives as judged by whether
measure would have been adopted if all its costs fell on Canadian nationals).
44. See Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 39, para. 5.22, at 1619.
45. See Wirth, A Matchmaker's Challenge, supra note 4, at 408 n. 113.
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The tuna panel report concluded that trade measures to protect resources
outside the jurisdiction of a contracting party are not permissible. 46 This
conclusion is-clearly new law. As Professor Stewart notes, 47 this rule has
obvious and significant implications for the Montreal Protocol on Substances
That Deplete the Ozone Layer which restricts trade in ozone-depleting
chlorofluorocarbons, certain products containing those chemicals, and po-
tentially products manufactured with such products with states not party to
the agreement. During the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol, the Trade
Representative issued an opinion on the agreement's anticipated trade meas-
ures that endorsed the use of trade measures to protect the ozone layer,
described the natural resources exception as "broad," ignored the "extra-
territorial" question on which the GATT panel's conclusion rested, failed
to address the desirability or necessity of a GATT waiver, and ultimately
gave a clean bill of health to trade measures of the sort contemplated for
that agreement. 49 Representatives of the GATT secretariat attended at least
some of the negotiating sessions leading up to the Montreal Protocol. As
a practical matter it would have been inconceivable for the agreement to
be adopted in its current form if the GATT secretariat had objected.
Continuing the analogy to the United States and the EC, Professor
Stewart argues that a free trade regime ought to have primacy in the
international system and that the current GATT text is sufficiently flexible
to provide a basis for a needed transitiqn to a system that more effectively
46. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 39, paras. 5.24-.26 & 5.31-32, at 1619-21.
This conclusion is not necessarily immune from criticism as a matter of treaty interpretation.
The panel placed considerable reliance on an earlier version of article XX(b), dealing with
human, animal, or plant life or health, that limited the exemption to cases in which "corre-
sponding domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in the importing country." Id. at
1620. The meaning of "similar conditions," while not entirely clear, certainly does not imply
the necessity for identical conditions. Moreover, if there are no "similar conditions," there
would be no need for "corresponding domestic safeguards," and the proviso would arguably
be without effect. In any event, as Professor Jackson notes in his article for this conference,
resort to prepa'atory work is less well accepted in the context treaty interpretation than in the
construction of domestic statutes. Jackson, supra note 12, at 1241. See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 32, 8 I.L.M. 679 (preparatory work as supplementary
means of interpretation if plain language "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure ... or
leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable"). An equally, if not more,
plausible interpretation of article XX would apply to cases in which there might be effects on
human, animal, or plant life or health or natural resources within a state's jurisdiction even
if the activities that give rise to the trade restrictions take place outside that jurisdiction. Such
effects are accepted in international law as a basis of jurisdiction to prescribe, which goes well
beyond the sovereign authority to establish at-the-border trade measures. See I RESTATEMENT,
supra note 4, § 402(c) & cmt. d.
47. Stewart, supra note 14, at 1366-67.
48. See supra note 17.
49. Memorandum from Amelia Porges, Associate General Counsel, Office of the United
States Trade Representative, to CFC Trade Work Group (January 14, 1986) (on file with
author).
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accommodates environmental values.50 While one might agree with Professor
Stewart that the trade regime can be rendered environment-friendly, it is
unrealistic to expect this to occur without a thorough reevaluation of the
current system.
In contrast to federal systems like the United States
5' and the EC, 2
GATT dispute panels do not have the power to compel performance of
relevant standards, environmental or otherwise. The GATT dispute settle-
ment process results only in a conclusion that a particular action is or is
not consistent with the regime. From a trade point of view this>makes
perfect sense. Impediments to trade result from affirmative governmental
measures, like tariffs, and the principal goal of a free trade regime is to
eliminate those governmental measures, which almost by definition promotes
liberalized trade. By contrast, international obligations with respect to the
environment-and many other areas as well-anticipate and require the
implementation of affirmative governmental actions intended to address
particular problems. From an environmental point of view, then, the inter-
national trade regime as currently structured is a no-win proposition: There
are no mechanisms for assuring the implementation of minimum govern-
mental measures, and once those policies that do exist are subjected to
trade-based scrutiny, nothing more than maintenance of the status quo can
be expected to result even in the best possible case. In short, to attain the
quasi-constitutional status Professor Stewart would assign to it, the GATT
needs to metamorphose into considerably more than the international version
of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Professor Stewart and Professor Jackson both appear receptive to a
trade regime that would accommodate trade measures that further the
purposes of multilateral regimes for protecting resources of the global
commons like Antarctica and the high seas.53 This is the easiest possible
case. Otherwise, the argument presumably goes, by comparison with re-
sources within the jurisdiction of sovereign states, there is little chance that
resources beyond national jurisdiction will be protected from environmental
externalities. The tuna case provides an interesting gloss on this perspective.
The United States has reached understandings under which Mexico and
Venezuela will abandon the practice of setting on dolphin, provided that
50. Stewart, supra note 14, at 1349-50.
51. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1988) (authorizing
reviewing court to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed");
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988) (codifying "action in the nature
of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof
to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff").
52. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 169-
71, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 75 (creating actions by member states or EC Commission in European
Court of Justice alleging "that a Member state has failed to fulfil any of its obligations under
this Treaty" and authorizing Court of Justice to require member states to take the necessary
measures to comply with judgment).
53. Stewart, supra note 14, at 1364-65; Jackson, supra note 12, at 1249-50.
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the U.S. ban on tuna imports is lifted.5 4 Although for an international
lawyer it is troubling, one way to read the history of this issue is that these
negotiated promises from Mexico and Venezuela-which the GATT tuna
dolphin panel implied would have been highly preferable to the import
ban5 5-were made possible only because of the leverage generated by the
unilateral trade measures concluded by the panel to be contrary to the
GATT. As the tuna panel pointed out, unilateral measures invite a crazy
quilt of inconsistent and not necessary effective national approaches that
may impede trade. On the other hand, national trade measures can provide
some minimal protection for resources beyond the jurisdiction of any state
that might otherwise be victims of the tragedy of the commons. Moreover,
as in the tuna case and countless others, unilateral regulation can galvanize
multilateral processes by increasing the incentives for effective multilateral
responses.1
6
Both Professor Stewart and Professor Jackson acknowledge that dis-
parities in domestic environmental policies can affect international compet-
itiveness.57 Interestingly, where Professor Stewart categorically rejects the
proposition that these disparities have any significance in a free trade
regime, 8 Professor Jackson appears cautiously receptive to
rules in the trading system that impose certain kinds of harmonizing
minimum level standards for environmental protection. In the al-
ternative, rules that impose certain kinds of trade detriments, such
as compensatory duties, on countries that do not adopt or enforce
the harmonized or minimal environmental rules, might also be
worthwhile.5 9
If multilateral agreements to protect resources of the global commons are
the easiest case, the trade consequences of different domestic standards that
do not necessarily involve impacts outside a state's own jurisdiction are the
hardest. Other, intermediate situations, as both articles suggest, might
include transboundary pollution that originates in one state and causes harm
in another.
A twenty-year old OECD recommendation, adopted in 1972, that artic-
ulates the so-called "Polluter-Pays Principle" 60 provides an informative
54. See Pro-Dolphin Accord Made, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1992, at D9.
55. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 39, para. 5.28, at 1620.
56. See, e.g., Steven J. Shimberg, Stratospheric Ozone and Climate Protection: Domestic
Legislation and the International Process, 21 ENVTL. L. 2175 (1991).
57. Stewart, supra note 14, at 1354-55; Jackson, supra note 12, at 1248-49.
58. Stewart, supra note 14, at 1356.
59. Jackson, supra note 12, at 1250.
60. Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental
Policies, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(72)128 (May'26, 1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1172 (1972)
[hereinafter 1972 Polluter-Pays Recommendation]. See generally Sanford E. Gaines, The
Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to Environmental Ethos, 26 TEx. INT'L L.J.
463 (1991).
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framework for analyzing the international significance of disparities in
domestic environmental policies. As the title of the Polluter-Pays Principle
suggests, the recommendation states that those that create environmental
externalities ought to bear the costs. Less apparent is that the Principle
includes a substantive standard of cost internalization as a test of the
adequacy of domestic environmental policies. Reflecting the views of envi-
ronmental economists, the recommendation states that
[w]hen the cost of [environmental] deterioration is not adequately
taken into account in the price system, the market fails to reflect
the scarcity of such resources both at the national and international
levels. Public measures are thus necessary to reduce pollution and
to reach a better allocation of resources by ensuring that prices of
goods depending on the quality and/or quantity of environmental
resources reflect more closely their relative scarcity and that eco-
nomic agents concerned react accordingly.
6'
Further, "the cost of [pollution control measures] should be reflected in
the cost of goods and services which cause pollution in production and/or
consumption. ' 62 For present purposes, the most interesting portion of the
recommendation is a passage that states that one of the purposes of the
Polluter-Pays Principle is "to avoid distortions in international trade, ' 63 a
goal apparently motivated as much by concerns about competitiveness as
by the desire to conserve environmental amenities.
Although the GATT permits application of the Polluter-Pays Principle
as a domestic environmental measure, the General Agreement does not
authorize the enforcement of that standard with respect to imported goods
through at-the-border measures like fees or duties to offset the costs to.
domestic industries of pollution control measures. 64 The OECD recommen-
dation does not suggest a change in the resulting GATT distinction, men-
tioned by Professor Stewart 6 and Professor Jackson" and reiterated in the
tuna dolphin panel report, 67 between products and processes. Instead, the
instrument states that "[e]ffective implementation of the guiding principles
set forth herewith will make it unnecessary and undesirable to resort to"
at-the-border adjustments like countervailing duties to equalize disparities
in national environmental policies.
68
61. 1972 Polluter-Pays Recommendation, supra note 60, Annex para. 2.
62. Id. at para. 4.
63. Id.
64. Report of the GA 7T Panel, United States- Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, para. 5.2.3-.7, GATT Doc. L/6175 (June 17, 1987), BISD 34th Supp. 136, 27
I.L.M. 1596 (discussing Polluter-Pays Principle).
65. Stewart, supra note 14, at 1365-66.
66. Jackson, supra note 12, at 1243-44.
67. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 39, para. 5.11-.15, at 1617-18.
68. 1972 Polluter-Pays Recommendation, supra note 60, at Annex para. 13. Cf. S. 984,
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The Polluter-Pays Principle has been accepted in the EC at least since
the 1972 OECD recommendation, 69 and an allusion to it is now included in
the Treaty of Rome.70 Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, 71 adopted at the Earth Summit in June 1992, affirms the
Polluter-Pays Principle at an unprecedented level of geneiality and univer-
sality. Rio Principle 16 does not mention trade implications except to note
that the Polluter-Pays Principle ought to be applied "without distorting
international trade and investment." Given that the Polluter-Pays Principle
is intended to prevent trade distortions, this caveat is quite curious, if not
downright incoherent.
Presumably the reasoning in the' recommendation proceeds from the
assumption that cost internalization is a minimum good practice standard
that should be adopted by all countries. Those that do not do so obtain an
unfair trade advantage, which, through application of the Polluter-Pays
Principle, can be distinguished from the "inherent" comparative advantage
that drives international trade. The 1972 OECD Recommendation conse-
quently elevates environmental policies that otherwise would be purely
domestic matters to the international level, which explains the justification
of the Principle as a mechanism to "to avoid distortions in international
trade." Similarly, the failure to adopt a minimum standard of internalization
is analogous to an export subsidy-a "pollution subsidy"-that creates
unfair trade advantages for industries in those states with environmental
policies below the international minimum standard.
Some have suggested that the calculation of external costs, particularly
in a foreign context and most especially in developing countries, would not
be easy. But the principle of cost internalization is a central and familiar
one in environmental economics. If this is a mortal defect in a trade context,
it should be no less fatal' in a variety of others. 72 Some have questioned the
wisdom of so-called "environmental countervailing duties. ' 73 Whatever the
merits of those arguments, there is no reason in principle to draw the line
at measures to protect the global commons adopted through multilateral
processes.
We can set our sights somewhat higher than mere peaceful coexistence
between trade and the environment. The alternative is continued clashes
102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) (proposed International Pollution Deterrence Act that would
authorize imposition of countervailing duties on manufactured goods from countries with
substandard environmental policies).
69.. See Gaines, supra note 60, at 477-81 (describing uneven application at national level).
70. Single European Act, supra note 1, at 5 (adding new article 130R, paragraph 2,
specifying "that the polluter should pay," to Treaty of Rome).
71. 31 I.L.M. 876, 879 (1992).
72. Cf. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 42, 474-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(upholding use of "contingent valuation" methodologies involving interviews to determine
individuals' willingness to pay for determining natural resources damages in cases where no
market exists in identical or similar resources).
73. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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between trade and environmental regimes that can only tend to erode the
integrity of both. When more than one hundred heads of state gather in
Brazil for the largest summit meeting ever, the notion that there are no
internationally accepted environmental minimum standards is no longer
consonant with current realities. Indeed, cost internalization and the Pol-
luter-Pays Principle-at least if one relies on the black marks on the
numerous pieces of paper coming from Rio-are precisely such a standard.
For some time trade agreements like the GATT have targeted certain export
subsidies,74 and, based on news reports, it sounds as if further trade
disciplines for agricultural subsidies are an essential precondition to the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round.5 Although the task is not necessarily
easy and it will require leadership and political will, there is no reason in
principle why an international trade regime could not move in the direction
of imposing a similar discipline on de facto pollution subsidies provided by
those countries with substandard environmental policies.
74. See, e.g., Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 31 U.S.T. 513, BISD 26th Supp. 56
(1980) (GATT Subsidies Code).
75. See supra note 6.
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